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MEANING POTENTIALS AND CONTEXT: 
SOME CONSEQUENCES FOR THE ANALYSIS OF 
VARIATION IN MEANING 
 
Jens Allwood 
Abstract 
The purpose of this paper is to suggest a view of word meaning on the type level 
based on “meaning potentials” rather than on reified type meanings founded on 
either of the two traditional approaches of abstract generalization (Gesamtbedeu-
tung) and typical or basic meaning (Grundbedeutung). It is suggested that actual 
meaning on the occurrence level is produced by context sensitive operations of 
meaning activation and meaning determination which combine meaning potentials 
with each other and with contextually given information rather than by some simple 
compositionality operations yielding phrase and sentence meaning from simple 
type meanings of one of the two traditional kinds. To establish this goal, I first 
present the traditional notions and discuss some problems which arise when trying 
to handle variation in meaning. I then specifically discuss the relation of homonymy 
and polysemy to the traditional notions. In section 3, I introduce the notion of 
“meaning potentials” as an alternative to the traditional notions and then discuss in 
section 4 how this notion might be used to handle problems of meaning variation, 
focusing especially on homonymy and polysemy. 
 
Keywords: determination of meaning; Gesamtbedeutung; Grundbedeutung; ho-
monymy; meaning activation; meaning potential; meaning variation; polysemy; 
reification. 
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1. Background 
1.1. Approaches to lexical meaning 
The nature of word meanings has been discussed since antiquity. The 
classical answers of realism, conceptualism, and nominalism (cf. 
Quine 1953a) derive from the ancient and medieval debate on the 
nature of universals. Realism is traditionally associated with the view 
that universals, and by extension word meanings, are abstract, inde-
pendently existing essences which can be captured by stating the nec-
essary and sufficient conditions for something to be what it is. Nomi-
nalism is a reaction to this view which instead claims that universals 
(word meanings) should be viewed purely extensionally as the set of 
things denoted by a particular word. On this view there is no such 
entity as “redness”, but only a multitude of things that are called 
‘red’. Conceptualism, proposed by Abelard (cf. Gilby 1967) building 
on Aristotle [1938], is a reaction to both of the preceding ideas, and 
claims that universals (word meanings) are concepts – mental or cog-
nitive constructs created in confrontation with experience. Most lin-
guists, if not philosophers, have since the days of Abelard probably 
been conceptualists in the sense that they have believed that word 
meanings are mental or cognitive constructs. The precise nature of 
the mental constructs corresponding to word meanings has, however, 
been controversial. Generally speaking, the following two positions 
can be discerned: 
 
(i)  The Gesamtbedeutung or “intersection” approach. A word 
meanings is the largest common semantic denominator for 
all uses of the word (or for all the things denoted by the 
word). This approach, in fact, is often equivalent to essen-
tialism. The essence or common denominator of a word’s 
uses is then characterized in terms of the necessary and suf-
ficient conditions for whatever the word denotes. This is the 
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view most often assumed in formal semantics and, if com-
bined with conceptual realism, the classical view of Plato. 
(ii)  The Grundbedeutung or “basic example” approach. A word 
meaning is associated with some concrete instance of the 
meaning. Mostly this instance is chosen because it is special 
in some sense. It could, for example, be the first instance of 
a meaning that a person encounters. This was the position of 
John Locke [1960]. It could also be somehow functionally 
or biologically primary. This is the position of the propo-
nents of “prototype” theory (Rosch 1977; Lakoff 1987). An-
other possibility is that it is the product of an idealization in-
tended to bring out a particular theoretical perspective. This 
is the idea behind the “ideal types” of Max Weber (Weber 
1951; Runciman 1972). Finally, it could be the instance of 
meaning that is most commonly associated with the word. 
This could be called the “stereotype” (cf. Putnam 1975). In 
this chapter, I will use the term “Grundbedeutung” for all 
approaches that regard “basic” or “typical” examples as the 
most important ingredient in their account of word meaning, 
irrespective of whether these “basic” examples are histori-
cally primary or whether they number more than one. 
1.2. The problem of variation in meaning 
Let us now see how the different approaches briefly described above 
deal with the problem of variation in word meaning. In order to do 
this, we will consider a few examples of variation in word meaning. 
1.2.1.  Nature and democracy 
In philosophy, conceptual analysis has often been based on an at-
tempt to define “concepts” (in effect “meaning” in the sense of Ge-
samtbedeutung) through the use of necessary and sufficient condi-
tions. An example can be found in the work of the American phi-
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losopher Arthur Lovejoy (1936), who distinguished 60 or more 
meanings of the word nature. Similarly, political philosophers have 
distinguished ten or more meanings of the word democracy. We may 
well ask whether this is a reasonable analysis from the perspective of 
a general approach to word meaning. 
Whether or not we think the analysis is reasonable depends very 
much on our view of lexical meaning. Given an approach in which 
meanings are identified with necessary and sufficient conditions, re-
sults like the ones proposed by Lovejoy are more or less inevitable if 
the words and concepts which are studied are to retain a substantial 
empirical content and still be sharply distinguishable from other 
words and concepts. It may however be questioned whether these 
goals, taken one by one or in conjunction, are reasonable. If we aban-
don the goals and try to derive a common meaning for all uses, we 
instead face the problem of very abstract or almost empty meanings 
for words such as nature and democracy. 
What the Grundbedeutung approach would lead to in this case is a 
little unclear since it depends on what type of Grundbedeutung is 
assumed. The kind of democracy which is ontogenetically or histori-
cally primary might not be prototypical democracy, ideal democracy, 
or even stereotypical democracy. Whichever kind of democracy is 
chosen as the Grundbedeutung, it is clear that some types of democ-
racy will have to be left out if only one Grundbedeutung is assumed. 
The next step would therefore be to assume several Grundbedeu-
tungs. A problem here is that Grundbedeutung implies that there ex-
ists one single basic meaning more strongly than prototype, ideal 
type, and stereotype. It might therefore be easier to use one of the 
latter three notions (cf. Lakoff 1987). The question is, however, how 
many meanings should be allowed and on what grounds? It is likely 
that if this question is pursued vigorously enough, the final answer 
will not be very different from that provided by those who believe in 
necessary and sufficient conditions. There will be many prototypical, 
ideal, and stereotypical democracies. 
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1.2.2.  Intention and result 
Most action verbs can be associated with an intention and a result 
and, very often, only one of the two need be present to justify the use 
of an action verb to describe a particular action (Allwood 1980). 
Consider the following examples: 
 
(1) a. I warned him but he did not hear me (intentional warning), 
“to notify” 
 b. I warned him without intending to do so (resultative warn-
ing), “to make someone aware of, e.g. by doing something 
(2) a. I flattered him but he did not notice (intentional flattery) 
 b. I flattered him unintentionally (resultative flattery), e.g. It 
flattered him that we still knew him. 
 
We may now ask whether intentional warnings and resultative warn-
ings, or intentional flattery and resultative flattery, constitute two 
different meanings of the verbs to warn and to flatter? Our answer 
will probably again depend on our view of meaning. If our criterion 
is necessary and sufficient conditions (i.e., Gesamtbedeutung), our 
answer will probably be yes, since it seems difficult if not impossible 
to define warnings without taking either intention or result into ac-
count; it is equally clear that the appropriate intention and result are 
not always present. Again, having only one meaning for warn or flat-
ter runs the risk of being too abstract, even vacuous. 
If we instead believe in Grundbedeutungs, we may choose one of 
the two cases or a combination of both as the basic meaning and then 
try to derive the other cases in some principled manner from the basic 
meaning. Another option would be to say that we have two Grundbe-
deutungs, which would diminish the difference between the Ge-
samtbedeutung and the Grundbedeutung approaches. 
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1.2.3.  The meanings of the verb gå in Swedish 
As a third example we will consider the Swedish verb gå, ‘to walk or 
to go’. Here are some of the very many uses of the verb (cf. Voion-
maa 1993): 
 
(3) (i)   Pelle går till skolan. 
    ‘Pelle walks to the school.’ 
 (ii)  Pelle går i skolan.  
    ‘Pelle goes to (attends) school.’ 
 (iii)  Bilen går bra.  
    ‘The car runs smoothly.’ 
 (iv)  Motorn går inte.  
    ‘The motor does not function.’ 
 (v)  Motorn går att laga. 
    ‘The motor can be mended.’ 
 (vi)  Det går inte att röka här.  
    ‘It’s not possible to smoke here.’ 
 (vii)  Det går inte an att röka här.  
    ‘It’s not socially acceptable to smoke here.’ 
 (viii)  Han går ofta på nitar.  
    ‘He often runs into problems.’ 
 (ix)  Han går ofta på bluffar. 
    ‘He is often fooled.’ 
 (x)  Han går på alla så där.  
    ‘He attacks everyone that way.’ 
 (xi)  Vägen går från Göteborg till Borås.  
    ‘The road leads from Göteborg to Borås.’ 
 (xii)  Han går på bussen.  
    ‘He enters the bus.’ 
 (xiii)  Det går bra.  
    ‘That will be OK.’ 
 (xiv)  Det går jag inte med på.  
    ‘I don’t accept that.’ 
 (xv)  Han går ut med henne.  
    ‘He dates her.’ 
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 (xvi)  Inget går upp mot sol.  
    ‘Nothing is better than sun.’ 
 (xvii)  När går du upp på morgonen?  
    ‘When do you get up in the morning?’ 
 (xviii) Vad går det ut på?  
    ‘What is it about?’ 
 
How many meanings of gå should we assume? Is the word homony-
mous or polysemous? Even if the problem can be somewhat reduced 
in complexity by regarding some phrases as separate verb particle 
constructions, the question arises as to whether there are in fact a 
finite number of meanings for gå or whether, as seems more likely, 
we can expect the number to vary with new meanings being continu-
ously added, which would imply that any approach based on a fixed 
set of meanings, whether it be based on generalizations or basic ex-
amples, would be inadequate. 
1.2.4.  Words that can function as several parts of speech 
Yet another problem concerns words that can be assigned to several 
parts of speech.  
In English it is very common for some words to be used both as 
verbs and nouns, e.g., to run (verb) and a run (noun), or a book 
(noun) and to book (verb). Other words can have verbal (be singing), 
adjectival (a singing child), and nominal uses (this singing).  In 
Swedish there is a similar variation between adjectival and nominal 
functions, e.g., unga plantor ‘young plants’(adjective) and de unga 
‘the young ones’ (noun). Are we to say that words such as book, sing-
ing, or unga are homonymous or polysemous, i.e., are they different 
words which just happen to coincide in form, or are we dealing with 
one word with several meanings associated with different parts of 
speech? If we want neither homonymy nor polysemy for such words, 
what would be involved in claiming that they are monosemous? 
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1.3. Meanings of different types of linguistic expression 
Linguistic expressions are not all of the same semantic type. Some, 
like nouns, pronouns, adjectives, and verbs, can be associated with 
denotations. Some, like verbs, pronouns, and some adverbs, help to 
deictically anchor what is said in the speech situation. Some, like 
other adverbs, prepositions, conjunctions, and quantifiers, are more 
difficult to associate with denotations and are more functional in 
character. Still others, like interjections, feedback words, and “com-
munication management words” (hesitation sounds, etc.), are expres-
sive rather than denotative. In addition, several types of expression 
such as you know are polyfunctional, in that they can have more than 
one of the above mentioned functions. 
It is not clear that the two approaches to meaning discussed above 
fit these different types of expression equally well. Which of the fol-
lowing alternatives is the best characterization of the meaning of the 
preposition in? (see also Vandeloise, This volume.) 
 
(i)  An abstract relation of inclusion (Gesamtbedeutung). This 
would be neutral as to whether we are talking about inclu-
sion in a mathematical proof or inclusion in a bottle. 
(ii)  A concrete spatial relation of inclusion (Grundbedeutung). 
This would claim that inclusion in a bottle is more basic 
than inclusion in a mathematical proof, and would perhaps 
try to derive the latter from the former. 
 
Whatever solution we adopt for in, it is not clear that we necessarily 
want to adopt the same solution for all other types of expression. 
2. Monosemy, polysemy and homonymy  
2.1. Criteria for polysemy and homonymy 
Linguists have long distinguished between polysemy and homonymy 
(e.g., Lyons 1977: 22, 235). Usually, an account like the following is 
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given. Homonymy obtains when two words accidentally have the 
same form, such as bank (‘land bordering on a river’) and bank (‘fi-
nancial institution’). Polysemy obtains where one word has several 
similar meanings, such as the may of permission (may I go now) and 
the may of possibility (it may never happen). Since it is not easy to 
say when two meanings are totally different or unrelated (as in ho-
monymy) or when they are just a little different or related (as in 
polysemy), it has been customary to adduce additional, more easily 
decidable criteria such as one or more of the following: 
 
(i)  If two linguistically distinct forms have historically coa-
lesced we have homonymy, otherwise polysemy.  
(ii)  If the meanings can be associated with two different parts of 
speech, we have homonymy, otherwise polysemy. This 
would mean that many if not most English concrete nouns 
are homonymous since by the process of coversion they can 
usually also be verbs, e.g. a chair - to chair, a table - to ta-
ble, a fork, - to fork, a telephone - to telephone, etc. Since 
most of these cases do not derive from different historical 
origins, we must either adopt a wider notion of homonymy 
and reject the historical criterion, or reject the part of speech 
criterion and say that part of speech variation is a case of 
polysemy. 
(iii)  If the meanings, although associated with the same part of 
speech, can be associated with two different inflectional 
paradigms, we have homonymy, otherwise polysemy, as 
with the French-based Swedish loanword en våg - flera 
vågor (‘a wave - many waves’), and the Germanic word en 
våg - flera vågar (‘a scale - many scales’). 
 
The trouble is that, although helpful, these criteria are not totally 
compatible and do not go all the way. There are cases where we may 
think that the meanings are clearly distinct and that we therefore have 
homonymy but which cannot be distinguished by the given criteria, 
e.g., charm (a kind of interpersonal attraction) and the term used in 
physics, i.e., charm (a kind of physical energy). Not even the word 
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bank, usually given in most textbooks as the archetypical example of 
homonymy, is clear-cut. Both the ‘financial bank’ and the ‘river 
bank’ meanings derive by a process of metaphor from old French 
banc ‘bench’. Since we are dealing with the same part of speech and 
there are no differences in inflectional paradigm, the meanings of 
bank are not a case of homonymy by any of the above criteria! The 
criteria also separate many things we perhaps feel are not so distinct, 
such as Swedish en öl ‘a glass or bottle of beer’ and ett öl ‘a kind of 
beer’, or the already discussed switch between verbs and nouns in 
English. It seems that, in the last analysis, we have to rely on our in-
tuition that clearly distinct meanings should be classified as homo-
nyms and that less clearly distinct meanings should be classified as 
polysemy. Traditional linguistic criteria for distinguishing homonymy 
from polysemy, although no doubt helpful, in the end turn out to be 
insufficient. 
Let us now consider whether the examples given above of nature, 
democracy, warn, flatter, and the Swedish verb gå are to be consid-
ered as cases of homonymy or polysemy. Guided by formal criteria, 
most linguists would probably say they should all be seen as cases of 
polysemy. But if we are to be guided by intuitions of distinctness of 
meaning, perhaps reinforced by an analysis of necessary and suffi-
cient conditions for distinct meanings, the answer is less clear. What 
does the meaning of nature in the nature of this equation is unclear 
have in common with the meaning of the word in our family enjoys 
life in nature, and what does a democracy which is a dictatorship for 
the “good of the people” (as in the people’s democracies of the for-
mer Soviet Union or China) have in common with so-called “direct 
democracy”. Concerning Swedish gå, we may ask what the meaning 
of ‘possibility’ has in common with the meaning of ‘walking’. Per-
haps, after all, these words should be regarded as homonymous … 
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2.2. Monosemous accounts related to Gesamtbedeutung and  
  Grundbedeutung 
We may now more explicitly relate the three notions of monosemy, 
homonymy, and polysemy to the two classical conceptualist ap-
proaches to word meaning discussed above. We will first discuss 
what would be involved in giving a monosemous account using the 
Gesamtbedeutung and Grundbedeutung approaches, we then turn to a 
consideration of homonymous and polysemous accounts. 
On the Gesamtbedeutung approach, a monosemous account would 
involve trying to find the largest common denominator for all the 
meaning variants of a word. After having excluded ‘government by 
the people’, because of the above mentioned people’s democracies, 
this might result in something like: democracy equals ‘some form of 
leadership involving people’ (which of course would not distinguish 
democracy from any other form of leadership), nature ‘something 
existing’ (which would not distinguish nature very well from any-
thing else), warning ‘behavior with causal potential to intentionally 
alert another person’ (which really includes most behaviors), gå ‘pos-
sible process’ (i.e., any process). The meanings are clearly too ab-
stract and general. The attendant loss of information would be so 
great that one would probably feel dissatisfied with a Gesamtbedeu-
tung approach and suggest instead that the words are homonymous or 
polysemous. 
On the Grundbedeutung approach, we might try to determine a 
prototypical sense of democracy, nature, warning, and gå. However, 
as already discussed, it is not entirely clear how this would be 
achieved. It is especially not clear that the same criteria for prototypi-
cality could be used in order to determine a prototype in all four 
cases. It also remains unclear whether any of the examples need more 
than one prototype (i.e., whether they are homonymous and/or poly-
semous) to do justice to the conceptual material involved. If we turn 
from prototypes to the other candidates for how to construct a 
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Grundbedeutung, e.g. “the original case”, “the ideal case” or “the 
most popular case”, it remains an open question whether any of these 
would actually in all cases correspond to what one might feel should 
be the basic meaning of a word. 
2.3. Monosemous accounts and context 
We will now discuss the problem of relating word meaning to con-
text. In a sense, most of the problems of meaning variation disappear 
if context is taken into account. The problems are to a large extent 
artificial, in the sense that they exist on an abstract type level but not, 
for the most part, on the level of concrete tokens and occurrences in 
context. It is when we attempt to give a general account of the mean-
ing of a word that the problem of how to harmonize very different 
shades of meaning (or different senses) arises; it is then that we have 
to decide whether to abandon monosemy and declare homonymy or 
polysemy.  
Let us now consider how the two approaches given a monosemous 
account in principle can be adapted to handle variation in meaning 
and contextual determination of meaning. 
 
Gesamtbedeutung: If we believe in common meanings, these will 
almost always turn out to be more abstract and general than meanings 
in context. What is needed will therefore be some process of “infor-
mation addition”. For example, if we analyze the meaning of the 
word I (‘ego’) as ‘the current speaker’, we need procedures for sup-
plying information about the identity of this person. Such procedures, 
in ordinary talk, are available through processing a combination of 
linguistic and non-linguistic information given by hearing and sight. 
 
Grundbedeutung: If we believe in basic meanings, we will instead 
need procedures of “information change” or transformation. For ex-
ample, if the basic meaning of friend includes such components as “a 
personal relationship”, “feelings of affection”, “mutual obligations”, 
and “common interest”, in order to account for a sentence like Chur-
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chill and Stalin were friends during the war we might have to make 
use of an operator of metaphorical extension which would delete 
most of the above given requirements on friendship. 
 
Neither of the two described procedures is unproblematic. “Informa-
tion addition” brings the problem of where the additional information 
comes from, and the criteria by which it is identified. In the case of 
deictic words like I, mentioned above, there is a fairly clear answer to 
these questions. The information can be obtained by direct perception 
in the speech situation. But the answer is not equally clear for words 
like nature or democracy. 
To some extent, “information change” involves the same prob-
lems as “information addition”, since some types of change involve 
addition of information. Very often, however, what is involved is the 
opposite, i.e., information loss. This is, for example, one of the essen-
tial ingredients of metaphorical extension which operates on the basis 
of similarity abstraction. This can be described as a selection of one 
or more properties which are similar to or compatible with other ele-
ments in the linguistic or extralinguistic context, while leaving out 
those properties which are not similar or compatible. 
2.4. Homonymous and polysemous accounts 
As we have seen, it is very likely that attempts to give a monosemous 
account of word meaning on a Gesamtbedeutung or Grundbedeutung 
approach will not be possible in all cases. Instead, in addition, one or 
both of the notions of homonymy and polysemy will have to be in-
troduced. On the Gesamtbedeutung approach, words will be associ-
ated with a more or less structured set of necessary and sufficient 
conditions, and on the Grundbedeutung approach with a more or less 
structured set of prototypes. However, the introduction of several 
reified meanings does not really solve the problem of how to handle 
meaning variation and contextual determination, since it introduces 
the problem of “information selection”, i.e., the problem of how to 
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select the contextually appropriate meaning variant in a particular 
circumstance. 
“Information selection” is a process which, on the basis of con-
text, selects the relevant meaning of a homonymous or polysemous 
word. Added to the problem of how and on what basis to determine 
the multiple meanings, we have the problem of providing criteria of 
selectional relevance. A popular suggestion is to analyze selectional 
relevance in a similar way to metaphorical extensions, i.e., in terms 
of compatibility of semantic features. Each meaning will thus have to 
be analyzed in terms of features, and that meaning is chosen which is 
most compatible with features of the preceding or possibly succeed-
ing words. Some problems with this approach are that it is not clear 
that all meanings can be successfully decomposed into features and 
that, even if such decomposition were possible, it is often too coarse 
a procedure for describing the resulting contextual meaning. Another 
problem is that the word meaning must often be compatible with 
more than just with features of the words in the local context. 
In addition, it would probably not be correct to assume that the 
problem of “selection” would entirely replace the problems of “addi-
tion” and “change”. It is more likely that however many meaning 
variants are chosen, they will remain contextually insufficient (see 
the discussion of gå), and that a Gesamtbedeutung approach will 
have to cope with both “information addition” and “selection”, while 
a Grundbedeutung approach will have to cope with both “informa-
tion change” and “selection”. 
3. Word meanings as meaning potentials 
To attempt to remedy, or at least give a new perspective on the prob-
lems discussed above, I would now like to suggest a slightly different 
approach to the problem of word meaning. In addition to the two 
alternatives discussed above, i.e., (i) intersection (Gesamtbedeutung 
or common meaning) and (ii) basic examples (Grundbedeutung or 
basic meaning), a third approach is proposed, namely (iii) the union 
or “meaning potential” approach. The inspiration for this way of 
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viewing lexical meaning comes from Wittgenstein’s ideas of “mean-
ing as use” and “family resemblance” (Wittgenstein 1952), as well as 
from Rommetveit’s observations on the role of context for meaning 
(Rommetveit 1974) and the ideas of Naess on “intentional depth” 
(Naess 1966). The notion is also very close to that of “meaning po-
tential” as used by Halliday (1976) and in some ways to the notion of 
“polysemy” employed by Bréal (cf. Nerlich & Clarke 1997). 
In brief, the proposal is that the basic unit of word meaning is the 
“meaning potential” of the word. The meaning potential is all the 
information that the word has been used to convey either by a single 
individual or, on the social level, by the language community. The 
meaning potential, then, does not result from trying to find a gener-
ally valid type meaning for a word. Rather, it is the union of indi-
vidually or collectively remembered uses. The union of uses may 
serve as a basis for attempting to find a common meaning in terms of 
necessary and sufficient conditions, or a basic meaning in terms of 
some criterion of typicality. The meaning potential is a unit on a 
more basic level than the two classical candidates for an analysis of 
word meaning and is therefore potentially compatible with both. 
A consequence of this approach is that there is no attempt to make 
any distinction between lexical and encyclopedic information in 
terms of the kind of information that is contained in the meaning po-
tential. Meaning potentials contain both kinds of information -- in-
formation deriving from use of language and information deriving 
from other experience with the world. (For arguments concerning the 
arbitrariness and difficulties of drawing a line between lexicon and 
encyclopedia, see Quine 1953b, Haiman 1980, Allwood 1981 and 
1989, Langacker 1987, and Geeraerts 1993.) 
Meaning potentials are activated through various cognitive opera-
tions. Some of these are triggered through language use. Others can 
be activated independently of language. Whether or not linguistically 
triggered, the activation of a meaning potential always takes place in 
a context which creates certain conditions for the activation. These 
conditions determine the way in which the potential is activated. The 
result of an activation is normally a structured partial activation of 
the potential. I will refer to such a structured partial activation of a 
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meaning potential as a “determination of meaning”. The various 
kinds of typification discussed in connection with Grundbedeutung 
above are all examples of activation operations. From the meaning 
potential of horse, we can, through different kinds of typification 
operations, produce a “prototypical horse”, an “ideal horse”, or a 
“stereotypical horse”. The three cases of typification are all examples 
of operations that can be triggered by a single word. Another exam-
ple of such an operation might be what we could call “abstraction of 
essence”, which would activate the necessary and sufficient criteria 
for being a horse. 
Normally, however, we are not concerned with activation of in-
formation through the use of single words but through the use of 
words constrained by other words and by extralinguistic context in 
such a way that the expression as a whole must make relevant sense 
in the situation at hand. A heavy question is, thus, a question which 
requires cognitive effort to understand and answer, while a heavy 
stone is a stone which requires physical effort to lift. The meaning 
potentials of heavy and question are activated more or less simulta-
neously in such a way that the head word of the constituent (ques-
tion) sets up criteria for what parts of the meaning potential for heavy 
can be activated if heavy is to serve as a meaningful and relevant 
property of question. The same kind of conditions on the activation 
of the meaning of heavy would come into play if the word were to be 
uttered as an elliptical comment on the difficulty of a previously 
posed question, as in the philosophical dialog in (4) below: 
 
(4)  A: What is the being of being? 
  B: Heavy. 
 
Another factor which comes into play is the memory of past activa-
tions. Once activated in a particular situation to meet certain contex-
tual requirements, a meaning potential is probably much easier to 
activate again in the same or a similar way. 
The notion of meaning potential provides a way of handling what 
has been called the “underspecificity of meaning”, i.e., the fact that 
the full lexical and structural potential of a linguistic expression is 
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normally not made actual use of. Only what is necessary and/or suffi-
cient for the needs of a particular communicative situation is acti-
vated. For example, we probably activate less information about 
“carburetors” when we interpret (5) than (6). 
 
(5)  A carburetor is a part of a car. 
(6)  A car need not have a carburetor since gasoline can be di-
rectly injected. 
 
In order to understand (5), the meaning of carburetor needs to be less 
specified than in order to understand (6). It follows that the activation 
of meaning potentials needs to be related to individual communica-
tors, since different individuals do not share the same elaboration of 
all meaning potentials and therefore cannot always activate the same 
information. The same kind of reasoning would apply to the interpre-
tation of so called PP attachments, a case of which is (7): 
 
(7)  The boy saw the girl on the street. 
 
Here a particular speaker or listener might not need to know whether 
both the girl and the boy, or only one of them, was on the street. For 
yet another person, this might be essential. 
Thus, the notion of meaning potential provides a way of conceptu-
alizing “underspecificity of meaning”, as well as other related notions 
such as the Norwegian philosopher Arne Naess's notion of “inten-
tional depth” (Naess 1966) and the notion of “depth of understand-
ing” discussed in Allwood (1976, 1986). 
4. Meaning potentials and the problems of word meaning 
Let us now consider how the proposal of contextually determined 
cognitive activation of meaning potentials can deal with the examples 
and problems previously discussed. 
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4.1. Democracy and nature 
On a meaning potential approach, democracy and nature would both 
be assigned only one meaning potential. In principle, then, we have 
monosemy. Operations of essence abstraction or typification (yield-
ing prototypes, ideal types, or stereotypes) could then in particular 
contexts be applied to the meaning potential to give less rich but 
more structured and determinate meanings. 
A consequence of having only one meaning potential is that the 
two words would not be homonymous. The question whether they 
would be polysemous requires somewhat more careful consideration. 
One answer is that they would not be, since each word has only one 
meaning potential. Another answer is that they potentially would be, 
since it is possible to partially activate the meaning potential in such 
a way that the activated information would correspond to each of the 
distinct meanings postulated by a reifying polysemy approach. How-
ever, a difference between a reifying polysemy approach and the 
meaning potential approach would be that the different meanings are 
not seen as a constant feature of a particular word. The fact that Ar-
thur Lovejoy could identify 60 meanings of nature, while a lexicog-
rapher might distinguish only five or six, is not a cause for concern. It 
simply means that they have activated the meaning potential in dif-
ferent ways. In due course, someone else will probably activate the 
potential in a different way and find a different number of meanings. 
Another difference, which follows from the first, is that there is no 
assumption that the different meanings are disjoint. Activation differ-
ences may be very gradual in response to different contextual re-
quirements. 
A third difference emerges in relation to the determination of 
meaning in context. On the Gesamtbedeutung or common meaning 
approach, this has to be accomplished by combining the addition and 
selection of information. On the Grundbedeutung or basic meaning 
approach, it has to be accomplished through a combination of change 
and selection. In the present approach, addition and change are not 
needed since the meaning constructs that necessitate these operations 
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are not viewed as fundamental but are themselves merely examples 
of ways in which information in a meaning potential can be activated. 
When it comes to the question of whether selection operations are 
needed, one answer would be that there is no selection since there is 
no set of reified meanings to select from. Another answer would be 
that, even if there is no selection, there is a process of activation 
which functionally resembles selection in that it only highlights cer-
tain parts of the information that is available in the meaning poten-
tial. (For other suggestions, using the “floodlight metaphor”of activa-
tion, see Geeraerts 1993 and Tuggy 1993, and for the related “aspect 
metaphor” see Allwood 1980.) However, a difference as compared to 
the preceding approach would be that activation is not merely seen as 
a passive selection of already available meanings or semantic features 
but also as an active construal or shaping of the activated informa-
tion. We will see below how this construal or shaping is very often 
triggered by so-called syncategorematic features. 
4.2. Intention and result 
Warn and flatter, like democracy and nature, would be associated 
with only one meaning potential. The differences between intentional 
and resultative warnings and acts of flattery would be seen as differ-
ences in activation triggered by differing contextual requirements on 
sense making. If a person does not hear a warning, aspects of the 
meaning potential of warn which are connected with results cannot 
be activated. Likewise, if an action of warning is explicitly stated to 
be unintentional, the aspects connected with intention cannot be acti-
vated. 
There is therefore no assumption of reified polysemy either on the 
type level or on the contextual token level. The type level is charac-
terized only as meaning potential, i.e., as unactivated potential infor-
mation which, as a consequence, is not polysemous. The token level 
will be characterized only by actualized activated information which 
normally will be nonambiguous, i.e., nonpolysemous. It should, how-
ever, be pointed out that the above observations do not exclude the 
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possibility that meaning potentials can be structured by habitual uses 
in set phrases or collocations or by encyclopedic facts. For example, 
the contrast between intention and result can, in appropriate circum-
stances, become a potential or more permanent structuring feature of 
many verbs. 
4.3. The verb gå 
As in the previous examples, gå would only be assigned one meaning 
potential. It would thus be neither polysemous nor homonymous. The 
different determinations of its meaning would be triggered by the 
requirement that the information which is activated is capable of con-
stituting a relevant and meaningful unit in association with informa-
tion activated by the other linguistic expressions with which it is con-
structed and by the extralinguistic context. 
Consider some of the expressions involving gå. Bilen går ‘the car 
runs’ cannot be construed in terms of walking since cars, as we 
know, cannot walk. Consequently, that part of the meaning potential 
of gå related to walking is not activated. Instead the notion of “func-
tioning activity”, which originally was probably derived from “walk-
ing” by abstraction and implication, is activated, giving the meaning 
‘the car functions’ or ‘the car is working’. Note that the present ap-
proach does not force us to assume that abstraction and implication 
take place ab novo each time we hear an expression like bilen går. 
Since, most likely, we have experienced similar uses many times 
before, the readiness for this kind of abstraction is part of the mean-
ing potential. Note also that we are not here making a covert assump-
tion of polysemy since, even if the meaning potential contains a 
readiness for uses which could be seen as fixed and extablished 
meanings, it is assumed that these meanings could also be produced 
ab novo, if the need arises. 
Let us consider one more use of gå, in the expression gå ut ‘gå + 
out’. It might be thought that this should be treated as a separate lexi-
cal item, since in Germanic languages like Swedish, verb+particle 
expressions often replace what in other languages (e.g. Romance) are 
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a single word. The following examples make clear that the situation 
is not so simple: 
 
(8)  Pelle går ut genom dörren  
  Pelle walks out through the door 
(9)  Pelle går ut med a trevlig flicka   
  ‘Pelle dates a nice girl’ 
(10)  Pelles prenumeration går ut   
  ‘Pelle’s subscription expires’ 
(11)  Pelle går ut med ett meddelande om konkurs  
  ‘Pelle sends out a notice of bankruptcy’ 
 
The examples show that the meaning of går ut shifts between ‘walks 
out’, ‘dates’, ‘expires’ and ‘sends out’ as a function of the lexical and 
grammatical context of the phrase. Each time the meaning potentials 
of gå (first anchored temporally by the present tense ending -r) and ut 
are activated and determined in such a way that the resulting meaning 
makes sense given the grammatical construction and the meaning 
potentials of subject, particle, preposition, and object. The cognitive 
operations which produce this result can be used ab novo but they 
can also be facilitated by the fact that the meaning potential contains 
traces of past activations of a similar type. 
It might here be worth pointibng out another feature of the notion 
of meaning potential. It involves both expression and meaning and is 
thus not a purely semantic notion. It is the word gå which has a 
meaning potential rather than any of its possibilities of meaning de-
termination. The verb promenera (‘to walk’, ‘to take a walk’) has a 
meaning potential which overlaps with that of gå. Both can mean ‘to 
walk’ but the other possible determinations of meaning for gå are 
normally not available for promenera. For example, an expression 
like motorn promenerar would, if comprehensible, receive as its pri-
mary interpretation ‘the motor walks’ rather than ‘the motor is run-
ning/working’, which would be the primary interpretation of motorn 
går. This shows that gå is conventionally associated with a set of 
meaning determinations which are not normally available for 
promenera. However, we might contextually force promenera to 
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acquire such a meaning determination by assuming that motorn 
promenerar was uttered by a person who did not fully know the lan-
guage. Meaning potentials are thus a result of conventionalizations of 
semantic operations meeting contextual requirements. 
4.4. Parts of speech 
In classical linguistic approaches, the question whether two meanings 
of a word can be associated with different parts of speech has often 
been taken as a decisive criterion for determining whether a word is 
homonymous or polysemous. In the present approach this criterion 
does not have a privileged status. The view can again best be dis-
cussed in relation to an example. Let us compare cases like a house - 
to house, a bike - to bike. Rather than postulating two different 
words, a noun and a verb, it is assumed that there is one root form 
(house and bike) with one meaning potential. This root meaning po-
tential has some structure and among other things contains the factual 
information that houses and bikes are independent material entities 
which can be used in certain ways. In the first case, the meaning po-
tential is activated through the indefinite article a (which semanti-
cally is an entity operator), producing the entity expressions (or 
nominals) a house and a bike; in the second case, it is through the use 
of the infinitival to, a process abstraction operator which produces 
the non-temporally anchored process expressions (or verbs) to house 
and to bike. Since houses and bikes denote independent material enti-
ties, the process abstraction activated by use of the infinitival to takes 
“house” or “bike” as arguments, in this case as instruments, yielding 
to house ‘process which uses house as instrument’ and to bike ‘proc-
ess which uses bike as instrument’. If we instead consider the root 
meaning of a process oriented root like run, its meaning potential 
would contain no information that run is an independent material 
object, but rather that it can be “a process of intentional quick leg 
movement”. An entity expression like a run must therefore derive an 
entity from this process. One way of doing this is by “holistic process 
reification”, i.e., by regarding the process as a whole as a reified en-
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tity. Another way is by resultative reification, e.g., a wash for the 
result of washing some particular entity. 
Returning to process abstraction, another role than instrument 
might be preferred depending on the nature of the process and of the 
entities involved, but the most common role in process abstraction 
from entity is that of instrument. In some cases, history and social 
convention have given the activated meanings a special status. For 
example, to book is not just instrumental in the sense of “to use a 
book”, but also locative in the sense of “to record something in a 
book, often to record a commitment to participation in a future 
event”. Over time, as the media have changed, this recording no 
longer has to be in a book. So today, to book has a meaning which is 
close to that of to order. The special sense of to book which, in this 
case and in many similar cases, is compatible with the effects of the 
original infinitival abstraction, are part of the meaning potential. 
However, it seems likely that even though we retain the ability to 
derive to book (in the sense of ‘to use a book’) by use of the infiniti-
val to on the root book, we also store a kind of phrasal meaning po-
tential for to book. 
The need to assume meaning potentials not only for roots but also 
for derived forms and phrases can be seen if we compare English 
with Swedish, where the definite article and infinitival form are 
marked as suffixes on the root. The example just discussed would, in 
Swedish, be as follows: root form bok ‘book’, bok-en ‘the book’, att 
bok-a ‘to book’, where only the a-suffix is needed to show the infini-
tival form. In Swedish, there would therefore be a meaning potential 
for bok which could be operated on through use of the definite and 
infinitival suffixes. Besides this basic pattern there would also be 
derived complex meaning potentials for boken ‘the book’ and boka 
‘to book’. The extent to which such derived complex meaning poten-
tials are mentally stored will probably depend on how often they are 
used and how irregular the meaning of the complex is in relation to 
its constituents. 
4.5. Meanings of different types of linguistic expressions 
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As has been noted above, different types of linguistic expressions, 
such as different parts of speech, often have different functions. The 
consequence for the present approach is that meaning potentials must 
be able to contain many types of semantic-pragmatic information. For 
nouns, verbs, adjectives, prepositions, and conjunctions, there must 
be information about entities, properties, processes, and relations as 
well as about states, events, and course of events. There must also be 
information about emotions and attitudes and about ways of manag-
ing communication. The latter type of information is especially im-
portant for interjections, feedback words, and hesitation words. The 
information must further clarify whether use of the word is to “ex-
press”, as in the normal use of the interjection wow or hesitation 
word eh, to “denote”, as in the normal use of words such as car and 
red, or to “anchor in the speech situation”, as in the normal use of 
pronouns, tense affixes, and definite articles. 
4.6. Contextual determination 
Contextual determination of meaning is a crucial feature of the pre-
sent proposal. Activated actual meaning only exists in context. Out-
side of context, there is only potential meaning. Contextually deter-
mined meaning is normally fairly unambiguous, even if there are 
exceptions. Ambiguities are mostly unactualized potentials which are 
allowed by the linguistic structure and can be observed by not taking 
all contextually given restrictions into account. 
In accordance with what has been suggested above, all linguistic 
expressions (morphemes, words, idioms, phrases, etc.) are associated 
with meaning potentials. Meaning potentials connect an expression 
both to encyclopedic information and to more specifically linguistic 
information concerning its use. When used, a linguistic expression 
activates its meaning potential through cognitive operations whose 
function is to achieve compatibility between the meaning potential of 
a particular expression, the meaning potentials of other expressions, 
and the extralinguistic context. Contextually determined meanings 
thus result from partial activation of the meaning potentials of the 
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expressions guided by cognitive operations. A subset of these opera-
tions can be characterized as semantic-epistemic operations (Allwood 
1989, 1998); the operations are connected with a linguistic expres-
sion or structural configuration and with a conceptual-epistemic ef-
fect. The basis for the operations are basic cognitive operations like 
discrimination, similarity abstraction, typification, and reification, 
which exist independently of language but are expanded and elabo-
rated by being connected with language. 
Given this outlook, a crucial task is to show how different contex-
tual requirements together contribute to activating linguistic meaning. 
Since this is a fairly complex task, all the present paper allows is a 
brief consideration of some of the main linguistic and extralinguistic 
requirements. 
4.6.1.  Linguistic requirements 
One way to approach the linguistic requirements on meaning activa-
tion is to divide the vocabulary into “categorematic” and “syn-
categorematic” expressions. Syncategorematic expressions consist of 
conjunctions, prepositions, pronouns, quantifiers, some adverbs, 
some interjections and derivational and inflectional suffixes, as well 
as “construction types” like predication, attribution, etc. The use of 
these expressions, as an important part of their meaning potentials, 
allows activation of the semantic-epistemic operations mentioned 
above. Another part of the vocabulary is made up of “categorematic” 
roots and stems, i.e., roots and stems which normally are used as 
nouns, verbs, and adjectives (as well as, in some cases, adverbs and 
interjections). The meaning potentials of such roots are claimed to be 
subject to both syncategorematic and categorematic contextual de-
termination yielding actual, more complex contextually determined 
meanings. Thus, the categorematic root run combined with the syn-
categorematic determiner a and the construction type “determiner-
head” yields as a result the nominal a run with a reified process 
meaning. Another example is given by the compound glass house, 
which requires a slightly different kind of activation than house 
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glass, since in the first case, glass has to be activated as a property of 
the head house and, in the second case, house has to be activated as a 
property of the head glass. Thus, syncategorematic requirements of-
ten determine the way categorematic terms should be related, i.e., the 
two ways of relating glass and house discussed above are syn-
categorematically different. The categorematic restrictions are given 
by the encyclopedic information connected with the meaning poten-
tials of the root forms glass and house themselves. 
Syncategorematic restrictions operate through the semantic re-
quirements of different grammatical constructions like modifier-head 
or subject-predicate. This idea is similar to the concepts of “tag-
meme” (Pike 1967) and “constructional meaning” (Goldberg 1995). 
They also operate, in general, through the use of inflectional and 
derivational morphology as well as through the use of syncategore-
matic or functional parts of speech like prepositions, conjunctions, 
some adverbs, numerals, interjections, feedback words, and “own 
communication management” words. The combination of categore-
matic and syncategorematic requirements constitutes the most impor-
tant part of the linguistic requirements on the activation of a word 
meaning. 
4.6.2.  Extralinguistic requirements 
Meaning is also determined through extralinguistic contextual condi-
tions and requirements. The most important of these are: (i) percep-
tually available information in the speech situation, (ii) requirements 
imposed by whatever activity the speaker and listener are pursuing, 
and (iii) other activated information. 
Perceptually available information in the speech situation is re-
quired to help determine the meaning of deictically used pronouns 
and adverbs. But it is also used to spatially and temporally anchor 
what is being talked about, by use of tense markers and adverbs. In-
formation concerning the activity is needed, for example, to help de-
termine the function of what is being said. The function of the word 
ice cream will, for example, vary depending on whether it is uttered 
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by an ice cream sales person as an offer of ice cream or uttered by a 
child as a response to a question like What do I have in the bag? or 
What would you like for dessert?. In the first case, it would here be a 
guess rather than an offer and, in the second, an assertion of a desire. 
Activity may also determine denotative meaning. Morphology means 
one thing when doing linguistics and another when doing cellular 
biology. Force means one thing in physics and many other things in 
everyday life. 
Finally, “other activated information” includes other types of acti-
vated information which perhaps extend outside of the immediate 
situation or the current activity. If I say Everyone came, the universe 
of quantification must be implicitly available if a meaningful predica-
tion is to result. If I say He is small, the universe of comparison must 
be implicitly available for a meaningful predication to be made. This 
type of information is necessary but does not need to be given by 
perception of a joint activity. 
4.7. Homonymy and polysemy 
What conclusions can be drawn with regard to the problems of ho-
monymy and polysemy? As we have seen, the approach suggested 
tries to make use of “reified polysemy” as little as possible. Words on 
the type level have meaning potentials which, depending on context, 
allow for many different determinations. Some of these might be 
frequently occurring, and traces of their activation can be stored as 
part of the meaning potential. They can, however, always be con-
structed again if they are products of regular processes for determin-
ing lexical meaning. In the case where such processes have been 
combined with idiosyncratic conventional features, like in the case of 
to book, these are separately stored. The present approach predicts 
that there is potentially a continuum of meanings (determinations of 
meaning) rather than a small set of meanings. It also leads to an ex-
pectation and a readiness for ever new shades of meaning. The mean-
ings which are actually constructed are always the products of mem-
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ory activation and the application of contextually sensitive cognitive 
and/or linguistic operations on meaning potentials. 
The approach, thus, does not assume that we either only store or 
only generate new meanings, but rather that we often do both, as is 
also claimed by Langacker (1987). We have mechanisms for partially 
activating meaning potentials in a context sensitive way which can 
always be used ab novo but, once an activation has taken place, we 
can store a trace of the activation and are, therefore, in a position to 
activate many meanings both productively and as a result of reactiva-
tion of a stored trace. Since the trigger for a particular activation of a 
meaning potential is a contextually given requirement of sense mak-
ing, mostly involving compatibility with the meaning potential of 
other words constrained semantically by a particular grammatical 
construction as well as by extralinguistic context, the traces of activa-
tion often involve storage of collocational relationships to other mor-
phemes or words as well as to stored information about extralinguis-
tic context. It is the complex of all this information which constitutes 
the meaning potential of a word. 
Returning to the notions of homonymy and polysemy, we have 
noted that traditional linguistic criteria are not in the end sufficient to 
distinguish the two notions. Let us now try to push the analysis fur-
ther by considering whether we should allow for reification of varia-
tion in meaning in some sense. The most radical approach answers 
this negatively and points out that, since very little actual ambiguity 
(except, perhaps, in jokes and word play) exists in word use on the 
occurrence level, homonymy and polysemy in a reified sense on the 
type level really only come into existence through the work of lexi-
cographers or other linguistic analysts who try to summarize the ac-
tual uses of a word. 
A less radical and perhaps more reasonable approach allows for 
reification of meaning variation also in ways which are more directly 
dependent on ordinary language users. We may here distinguish reifi-
cation on an individual and a collective level. On the individual level, 
we could talk of variation in type meaning which is reified in the 
sense of being stored in memory because of:  
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(i)  being so different that separate meaning potentials have de-
veloped, 
(ii)  irregularity in derivation, 
(iii)  habitual occurrence in a specific collocation, 
(iv)  study of dictionaries, or  
(v)  remembered explicit stipulations.  
 
For example, we might stipulate the polysemy of crawling by ab-
stracting over and reifying its meanings in examples such as the fol-
lowing (cf. Fillmore and Atkins 2000, from whom the examples are 
taken):  
 
(12) a. A small baby crawled out on its hands and knees. 
 b. The two hedgehogs crawled from the nest. 
 c. A beetle began to crawl up his leg. 
 d. She felt his hand crawling up her thigh. 
 e. A cloud of steam crawled slowly upwards from the chimney. 
 f. I crawled into my sleeping bag. 
 
On the collective level we could talk of reification in at least three 
senses: 
 
(i)  Similarities between language users with regard to criteria 
(i) – (v) above. The greater the degrees of similarity, the 
more individual reification will be established. 
(ii)  The existence of norms and normative sanctions supporting 
the similarities between users. 
(iii)  The existence of artifacts (like dictionaries) externally reify-
ing and supporting certain patterns of meaning differentia-
tion. 
 
We can use these five individual and three collective criteria of reifi-
cation to define more or less restrictive notions of polysemy and ho-
monymy. In fact, we face what is basically a terminological choice, 
and different authors might want to define polysemy in different 
ways depending on their theoretical interests or goals. We might 
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note, however, if we want to make use of both the terms homonymy 
and polysemy, a restrictive use of polysemy will force us to make an 
even more restrictive use of homonymy. Since this might be incon-
venient, a proposal which gives both terms a clear domain of applica-
tion and allows a fairly clear way of distinguishing them is probably 
to be preferred over one which does not. A suggestion in this direc-
tion using the first three criteria on the individual level is the follow-
ing. Homonymy could be used when actual variation in meaning is 
felt to necessitate the assumption of two or more disjoint meaning 
potentials on the type level. A somewhat broader notion would also 
include cases when a particular determination of meaning can not be 
produced by regular context sensitive meaning activation operations 
from a meaning potential. When it can be produced in a regular way, 
we speak of ‘polysemy’. This suggestion would make polysemy the 
general case for word meaning on the type level and thus, perhaps, 
come close to Bréal’s conception of polysemy of 1897 (Nerlich and 
Clarke 1997). The fact that bike has a potential for both an object and 
a process determination is not sufficient to say that the root is ho-
monymous, since both processes are regular. The expression to bike 
is regularly derived as a process involving a bike as an instrument or 
object and, following this suggestion, we would regard both as part 
of the regular polysemy of bike. 
However, the case would be different if we turn to the expression 
to book since here the derivation is not regular. To book does not 
normally mean a process involving a book as an instrument or object. 
But, as we have mentioned above, for historical reasons, a very spe-
cific use was conventionalized, whose function is such that it requires 
no books at all today. In this case, it would, therefore, be possible to 
speak of homonymy. The discontinuity between the two meaning 
determinations is also strengthened by the fact that they are associ-
ated with different parts of speech, but this is an auxiliary rather than 
a decisive criterion. 
The suggestion is therefore to associate polysemy with regular 
variation in meaning and homonymy with disjoint meaning potentials 
as well as with the lack of existence of regular processes of context 
sensitive activation. This leads to the question what a regular activa-
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tion is. I will first give a few examples of polysemy here (for further 
examples, see Allwood 1989, 1998; Pustejovsky 1991). 
 
1. The relation between instance and type in Swedish 
 (i)  instance   Där kommer en bil  
         ‘A car is coming’ 
 (ii) type     Volvo är en bil jag gillar 
         ‘Volvo is a car I like’ 
2. Activity dependent focus shifts 
 (i)  object -> process a bike - to bike 
 (ii) process -> object John is washing - Take your washing 
 (iii) object -> event  The film -> During the film 
 (iv) event -> object   During dinner -> Eat your dinner 
 (v) intention     I warned him but he did not hear me 
 (vi) result      I warned him without intending to 
3. The relation between individual and substance in Swedish 
 (i)  individual    Där kommer en bil 
          ‘A car is coming’ 
 (ii) substance    Här får du inte mycket bil för 
          pengarna 
          ‘Here you don’t get much car for the  
           oney’ 
 
Homonymy is involved when no regular derivation of this type can 
be found or when there are a number of special restrictions on the 
derivation. This treatment of homonymy means that we have a fairly 
broad notion and that the meanings covered by a single word form, in 
fact, can be more or less disjoint. If a word has two meanings that are 
very different, like the two meanings of bank, a joint integrated 
meaning potential could hardly exist. Even if a child misled by the 
similarity tried to build one up, it would sooner or later probably de-
velop into two different potentials. In other cases like book, the his-
torical connection is more recent, so that for some historically ori-
ented persons the variation in meaning would tend toward polysemy 
rather than homonymy. 
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As regards the linguistic criteria for homonymy, they also play a 
role in the present approach. If two meanings are really disjoint, the 
fact that different syncategorematic operations can be applied to the 
different meanings tends to reinforce the impression that there are 
several meaning potentials rather than one. Differences in inflectional 
paradigms are therefore also in this approach a reason to declare ho-
monymy. But it is not a foolproof reason. If two meanings have much 
in common, as in the case of a bike and to bike, the differences might 
rather be attributable to a set of regular meaning determining syn-
categorematic operations which have activated the difference than to 
irregularity and an inherent disjoint structure in the meaning potential 
itself.  
The suggestion is thus to use ”polysemy”, on the type level, for all 
variation of meaning supported by regular derivational processes. 
Some parts of this variation will be reified in the sense of being 
stored in memory supported by often used collocations. It might also 
be reified by individual stipulations or by being recorded by lexicog-
raphers. “Homonymy” is reserved for variation in meaning which is 
connected with disjoint meaning potentials or which cannot be pro-
duced by regular processes. This is, however, a terminological choice 
and nothing much in the arguments presented above for meaning 
potentials and contextual determination would depend on it.  
5. Summary and conclusion 
In this chapter, I have attempted to show that traditional theories of 
word meaning often lead to a very large number of reified meanings 
combined with procedures for selecting the contextually appropriate 
meaning. If instead only one or a small number of meanings is as-
sumed, these theories are forced also to assume a number of mean-
ing-adding and meaning-changing operations which are difficult to 
justify. Sometimes these two difficulties are combined, as when each 
word becomes associated with a multiplicity of reified meanings, 
which forces the assumption of selection mechanisms as well as of 
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operations of addition or change in order to produce contextually 
appropriate meanings. 
As an alternative to these approaches a suggestion is made where 
words on the occurrence level are seen as, in general, monosemous. 
On the type level, these words are also, as often as possible, seen as 
monosemous and associated with a meaning potential. The meaning 
potential is an activation potential for all the information (linguistic 
and encyclopedic) connected with a word. It can be structured in 
various ways, for example by being connected with a basic epistemic 
or ontological orientation such as entity, process, or property. So, for 
example, bike has an entity orientation while wash has a process ori-
entation. The meaning potential also contains traces of meaning de-
terminations through coactivation with other linguistic expressions. 
These traces can be freshly produced if the process of meaning de-
termination is of a regular type. If this regular type occurs frequently, 
it can be stored and merely reactivated rathern than freshly produced. 
If it is of an irregular type, as in the case of deriving to book from 
book, the collocation probably acquires a permanent meaning poten-
tial of its own with new information which can be more or less con-
nected with the regularly activated information. If the processes of 
activation are regular and based on a common underlying meaning 
potential, it is suggested that the term polysemy be used. If they are 
irregular, leading to disjoint meaning potentials, the term homonymy 
can be used. 
The contextually determined meaning of words on the occurrence 
level is, thus, usually monosemous and is the result of an imposition 
of a number of linguistically and situationally given requirements on 
the activation of a meaning potential. Ambiguity and polysemy are 
seen as non-actual structural possibilities which exist only when we, 
as analysts or speakers, ignore some of the contextual restrictions on 
meaning. Since the degree to which a meaning potential needs to be 
activated also varies with context, the phenomenon of underspecific-
ity turns out to be an expectable feature of the contextual determina-
tion of meaning. The approach thus allows for homonymy when 
meanings are conceptually disjoint, but appeals to this notion as sel-
dom as possible. Homonymy is involved, only when an explanation 
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in terms of a linguistically and extralinguistically conditioned activa-
tion of two or more meanings from a joint meaning potential fails. 
We also pointed to the continuum which exists from regular context 
sensitive activation of a meaning potential to polysemy and ho-
monymy. This continuum, to be sure, still leaves open the question, 
how to delimit polysemy in relation to variation in word meaning on 
a type and occurrence level. If a greater degree of specification is 
desired, this could be obtained by talking of “type polysemy” and 
“occurrence polysemy”. 
Finally, it is worth pointing out that the meaning potential ap-
proach in relation to traditional approaches is, in a sense, a case of 
trying both to eat  your cake and to keep it too. This is so because the 
meaning potential approach allows both generalizations (Gesamtbe-
deutungs) and typical examples (Grundbedeutungs) to be produced 
from the meaning potential, when needed. However, both approaches 
are seen as making use of processes available for the contextual de-
termination of meaning rather than as descriptions of the ultimate 
nature of meaning. 
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